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Abstract: Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing 
of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic 
Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of 
basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and 
Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the 
epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, 
would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism 
is false. This paper critically examines those arguments, finding them wanting. 
However, I develop an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that succeeds 
which turns on general reflection on the nature of value.  
 
On a widely held view, true beliefs are of final epistemic value. An interesting question is 
whether, and why, anything else is. Some authors hold that truth is the most basic thing of final 
epistemic value, embracing a version of “Epistemic Value Monism” that is sometimes called 
“Vertisim” or “Truth Value Monism.” Other authors demur, maintaining that the epistemic value 
of truth cannot explain the epistemic value of everything. Such authors embrace a kind of 
“Epistemic Value Pluralism.” The debate between Epistemic Value Monists and Pluralists is an 
important one. For instance, some philosophers might be inclined to understand other epistemic 
categories—e.g., epistemic obligations or epistemic virtues and vices—in terms of their relation 
to epistemic value. Clearly settling what is of epistemic value would be important for such 
projects.  
Various arguments have been given against Truth Value Monism and in favor of Epistemic 
Value Pluralism. We can separate those arguments into two categories. Knowledge based 
Arguments argue that because the epistemic value of truth cannot explain the epistemic value of 
knowledge we must embrace Epistemic Value Pluralism to explain the epistemic value of 
knowledge. Non-Knowledge based Arguments argue that the epistemic value of truth cannot 
explain the epistemic value of things besides knowledge. In other work, I have discussed 
Knowledge based Arguments and will not discuss them here. 
Rather, the aim of this paper is to examine Non-Knowledge based Arguments for Epistemic 
Value Pluralism. I will argue several such arguments fail—they are implausible, obscure, 
actually consistent with Truth Value Monism, or neglect the relevant distinction between basic 
and non-basic final value (see below). Nonetheless, I will claim that there is one Non-Knowledge 
based Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that succeeds. That argument turns on plausible 
general claims about final value.  
After setting the stage in section I, I examine an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism 
due to Jonathan Kvanvig in section II. I show how his argument is too obscure to carry force. In 
section III, I focus on a more straightforward argument from Kvanvig on the nature of 
understanding. But I argue Kvanvig’s view is actually consistent with Truth Value Monism. In 
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section IV, I examine a sequence of arguments from Michael DePaul, including one about the 
appropriateness of responding to experience. I argue that DePaul’s account is implausible and a 
more plausible one is consistent with Truth Value Monism. Finally, in section V, I argue that 
there is an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that is plausible that turns on the idea that it 
is of final value to value what is of final value. I defend this argument from an objection based 
on an alternative account of the nature of epistemic value.  
I. Stage Setting 
By “final epistemic value,” I have in mind the kind of value that, from the epistemic point of 
view, is valuable in and of itself or for its own sake. I will not offer any analysis of the epistemic 
point of view. I assume that final epistemic value is a kind or species of final value. I do not 
assume that final epistemic value exhausts all the kinds of final value.  
It is widely thought that final value has some sort of important connection to valuing. There 
are different accounts of this connection. Some offer a deontic connection: when something is of 
final value, we are obligated to value it; others offer a rationalist connection: when something is 
of final value, it is rational to value it; some offer a reason based account: when something is of 
final value, there is reason to value it. My own preferred view is that something is of final value 
just when it is appropriate to value it. I will assume it in what follows. Little will hang on this 
internal dispute in what follows.  
In evaluating the dispute between Epistemic Value Monism and Epistemic Value Pluralism 
it will be important to have an account of the distinction between the two. However, one natural 
way of formulating the distinction between them is problematic. Specifically, it is natural to 
suppose that proponents of Epistemic Value Monism hold: 
For any x and some P, if x is of final epistemic value, then x is P. 
Different proponents of Epistemic Value Monism may give different accounts of P. For instance, 
on this way of thinking, Truth Value Monists hold: 
For any x, if x is of final epistemic value, then x is a true belief. 
Epistemic Value Pluralists would then be people who reject this general characterization. 
This way of formulating the dispute is problematic because it contains a problematic 
characterization of Value Monism. As I’ve argued elsewhere (2018), value monists will want 
their view to have ontological flexibility. That is, they will want a wide range of things to be of 
final value—e.g., outcomes of actions, lives, entire possible worlds, etc. But this view will not 
have the desired flexibility. (Outcomes of actions, for instance, are not true beliefs.) Instead, we 
should think that what makes that position a monistic one is not that it maintains that only one 
kind of thing is of final value. What makes it monistic is that it maintains that any time 
something is of final value an explanation of its final value will refer to its connection to one 
kind of thing. For these reasons, proponents of Epistemic Value Monism should reject: 
For any x and some P, if x is of final epistemic value, then x is P. 
For this is too narrow a view of what is of value even by the monist’s lights. 
To understand the dispute between Value Monists and Pluralists, it will be helpful to 
introduce some terminology. Let us say something is of “basic final value” just when it is of final 
value but there is no explanation of the final value it has in terms of other things of final value.2 
Something is of “non-basic final value” just when it is of final value but there is an explanation 
of the final value it has in terms of other things of final value. Disputes between Value Monists 
 
2 This leaves open that there is an explanation of why something is of basic final value that does not appeal to 
final value. In this way, the distinction does not assume that epistemic value is, in some important meta-normative 
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and Value Pluralists can then be understood as disputes about basic final value. Specifically, in 
this context, Epistemic Value Monism holds: 
For any x and some P, if x is of basic final epistemic value, then x is P. 
Epistemic Value Pluralists would reject this. But both Epistemic Value Monists and Pluralists 
can agree that a wide range of otherwise metaphysically distinct things are of final epistemic 
value. Their dispute is simply over whether, to explain such facts, we need to appeal to the final 
value of one thing or many. (For more on basic final value and issues involving Monism vs 
Pluralism, see Feldman (2000, 2004), Zimmerman (2001), Perrine (2018).) 
Understood in this way, Epistemic Value Monism says that there is only one kind of thing 
that is of basic final epistemic value. However, this leaves open what exactly is of basic final 
epistemic value. There could be different “versions” of Epistemic Value Monism that identify 
different kinds of things as being of basic final epistemic value. For purposes of this paper, I will 
focus on Truth Value Monism, understood here as the position that the only kinds of things that 
are of basic final epistemic value are true beliefs. I will focus on this version of Epistemic Value 
Monism because it is the usual foil to Epistemic Value Pluralism.  
II. A Plurality of Evaluations—Kvanvig  
One critic of Epistemic Value Monism is Jonathan Kvanvig. In an important paper 
defending Epistemic Value Pluralism (2005), he urges that seeing truth as the sole or 
fundamental goal has a “strong reductionist flavor” (2005: 287).To get us to see this, he first 
characterizes epistemology as “the study of purely theoretical cognitive success,” and urges that 
we see value in each “independent kind of cognitive success” so that what is of final epistemic 
value would include a wide range of things including “knowledge, understanding, wisdom, 
rationality, justification, sense-making, and empirically adequate theories in addition to getting to 
the truth and avoiding error” (2005: 287). For ease of reference, let’s call this list ‘Kvanvig’s 
laundry list.’  
However, it is not clear exactly what argument against Epistemic Value Monism Kvanvig 
intends to be defending. Perhaps Kvanvig’s argument is this: 
(P1) If something is a “purely theoretical cognitive success,” then it is of final 
epistemic value. 
(P2) There are many independent kinds of purely theoretical cognitive successes. 
(C1) So, Epistemic Value Monism is false. 
In defense of the second premise, Kvanvig may point to his laundry list. However, once we’ve 
drawn the distinction between basic final epistemic value and non-basic final epistemic value, we 
can see that this argument is invalid. For even if there are many kinds of “purely theoretical 
cognitive successes” it may still be that their value is always explained by appealing to one kind 
of thing of basic final epistemic value. Once we recognize this distinction, pointing to a plurality 
of things of final epistemic value cannot, in and of itself, show Epistemic Value Monism false.  
Kvanvig might shore up this argument by maintaining that:   
(P1) If something is a “purely theoretical cognitive success,” then it is of final 
epistemic value. 
(P2) There are many independent kinds of purely theoretical cognitive success. 
(P3). At least one of the independent kinds of purely theoretical cognitive success 
have final epistemic value that cannot be explained by appealing to a single kind 
of basic, final epistemic value. 
(C1) So, Epistemic Value Monism is false. 
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This argument avoids the problem of the previous one. But the inclusion of the terminology 
“purely theoretical cognitive success” is now unnecessary. If (P1)-(P3) is true, then a weaker set 
of premises will also produce a valid argument against Epistemic Value Monism: 
(P4): There is at least one thing of final epistemic value whose final value cannot 
be explained by appealing to a single kind of basic final epistemic value. 
(C1) So Epistemic Value Monism is false.  
At this point, it appears that the terminology  of “purely theoretical cognitive success” is, at best, 
doing no necessary work and, at worse, is unduly obscure. 
The best way to defend (P4) would be through existential generalization—to give an 
example of something that is of final epistemic value whose value cannot be explained by the 
final epistemic value of one thing like truth. I will focus on whether Kvanvig has given us any 
promising examples of this. The most promising example would be understanding. I focus on it 
next. 
III. Kvanvig on Understanding 
Kvanvig argues that the value of understanding is not explained by the value of true belief. 
If Kvanvig is correct about this, then we have an argument for (P4). This section critically 
examines Kvanvig’s argument.   
Kvanvig focuses on the kind of understanding at issue when one understands that something 
is the case (2003: 189-90). To use his example, consider someone’s understanding of the 
“Comanche dominance of the southern plains of North America from the late seventeenth until 
the late nineteenth centuries” (2003: 197). Kvanvig makes three key claims about this kind of 
understanding. First, it is, for the most part, factive: such a person has a large number of true 
beliefs, and in so far as they have false beliefs on the subject matter, those false beliefs are 
peripheral.3 Second, these true beliefs need not amount to knowledge. A person whose true 
beliefs are “Getterizied”—who, for instance, by pure coincidence picks up a book which 
contains true claims about the Comanche which were, nevertheless, shots in the dark by the 
author—can still possess understanding. In this way, understanding is not “a species” of 
knowledge.4 Finally, understanding requires “grasping” the relations between the items of 
knowledge, specifically the way in which that information “coheres” with one another (2003: 
197, 202). 
The value of understanding, as Kvanvig sees it, derives from two places. First, it derives 
from the number of true beliefs that help make up understanding. But, secondly, it derives from 
the “grasping” that is required for understanding. Kvanvig writes:  
[To account for the value of understanding] we need to return to the notion of 
subjective justification, the value of which was defended earlier. Subjective 
justification obtains when persons form or hold beliefs on the basis of their own 
subjective standards for what is true or false. (2003: 200) 
 
We thus get the following explanation of the value of understanding. The 
distinctive element involved in it, beyond truth, is best understood in terms of 
grasping of coherence relations. Such coherence relations in this context 
contribute to justification. Such justification is subjective, because the person in 
 
3 Kvanvig does not spend much time on what counts as peripheral; neither will I. For critical discussion, see 
Elgin (2009) and Riggs (2009). 




question must grasp the marks of truth within that body of information in order to 
grasp correctly the explanatory relationships within that body of information. 
(2003: 202) 
So, on Kvanvig’s view, the grasping of coherence relations helps lead to subjective justification, 
and because the latter is valuable, the former is as well. 
Clearly, if Kvanvig’s view on the value of understanding is inconsistent with Truth Value 
Monism it will be inconsistent because of his view on the valuing of graspings. On Kvanvig’s 
view, graspings lead to subjective justification, which he claims is of value. He distinguishes 
between two kinds of extrinsic value (2003: 60-5). The first kind is the standard instrumental 
value, where something is of instrumental value when (roughly) it is an effective means to a 
valuable end, increasing the likelihood of securing that value (2003: 63). Kvanvig considers a 
second kind of extrinsic value, which need not be an effective means to a valuable end but is 
rather an “intentional means.” An action (for instance) is an intentional means to a valuable end, 
when a person undertakes that action with the aim of achieving that valuable end (2003: 60). The 
distinction between an effective means and an intentional means are illustrated in cases where 
there is no action that I can perform that will make it more likely that I’ll achieve a valuable end, 
but nevertheless there are actions I can undertake with the aim of achieving that valuable end. To 
use Kvanvig’s own example, perhaps there is nothing I can do to sink a basketball shot from half 
court and win a million dollars—so that there are no effective means to that end—but there are 
actions I can perform with the aim of achieving the end—so there are intentional means (2003: 
60-1). 
The notion of intentional means thus far developed only applies to actions. But, Kvanvig 
claims, it can also be extended to beliefs (2003: 65-75). Thus, consider a person who follows 
their own standard—whatever it is—for getting at the truth. Let’s say that a person’s belief is 
subjectively justified when it is held in accordance with their own standard (2003: 56). Even if 
the person’s own standards are woefully inadequate—so that it is not an effective means to get to 
the truth by following those standards—following those standards will be an intentional means 
and thus valuable. Thus, subjective justification is valuable as a kind of intentional means.  
One might object to Kvanvig’s argument at several places here. One might argue that 
understanding does not require subjective justification. Or one might argue that the notion of 
intentional means cannot apply to belief. Or one might argue that intentional means are not 
extrinsically valuable. But none of these objections are necessary to defend Truth Value 
Monism. For Truth Value Monism is a position about final epistemic value—it is a thesis about 
what is valuable for its own sake. But it is perfectly consistent to accept Truth Value Monism 
and hold there are many different kinds of things with extrinsic epistemic value. For instance, 
one might hold that reliable belief forming processes are valuable but only extrinsically, 
specifically, instrumentally because they are likely to lead to true beliefs. But even if we follow 
Kvanvig and “loosen up” extrinsic value to allow for another kind of extrinsic value distinct 
from instrumental value, this is perfectly consistent with Truth Value Monism. Consequently, 
Kvanvig’s account of the value of understanding provides no problem for this version of 
Epistemic Value Monism.5 
IV. DePaul against Epistemic Value Monism 
 
5 These points do not require that final epistemic value always supervenes on the intrinsic features of 
something. (In fact, Truth Value Monism probably could not say that, since truth is not an intrinsic property.) They 
only require that the category of extrinsic value is distinct from the category of final value in that being of extrinsic 
value does not entail being of final value, which is clearly true.  
6 
 
Another proponent of Epistemic Value Pluralism is Michael DePaul. DePaul criticizes Truth 
Value Monism before offering up his own version of Epistemic Value Pluralism. In what 
follows, I’ll briefly sketch and respond to his criticisms of Truth Value Monism before 
discussing his positive view.  
A. DePaul’s Argument against Truth Value Monism 
DePaul’s first criticism goes (2001: 173):  
…I think deep down we all recognize that truth is not the only thing of epistemic 
value. Here is an easy demonstration. Take your favorite well-established 
empirical theory, a theory you believe that we know. Throw in all the evidence on 
the basis of which we accept that theory. Depending on the theory you selected, 
all this will likely add up to a substantial number of beliefs. Now compare this set 
of beliefs with an equal number of beliefs about relatively simple arithmetic sums 
and about assorted elements of one’s current stream of consciousness. I suspect 
that most of us would want to say that the first set of beliefs is better, 
epistemically better, than the second set. But the two sets contain the same 
number of true beliefs. And so, to the extent that we are inclined to say that these 
sets differ with respect to broad epistemic value, it would seem that we are 
committed to saying that truth is not the only thing has broad epistemic value. 
The thrust of his criticism is clear: the only way to accommodate a difference in epistemic value 
between these two sets is to postulate something else of epistemic value and embrace a kind of 
Epistemic Value Pluralism. 
However, DePaul is wrong that the only way to accommodate this difference in epistemic 
value is to postulate something else of basic final epistemic value besides truth. First, one can 
retain Truth Value Monism and account for the difference of value between these two sets by 
appealing to the conditions under which truths have any epistemic value whatsoever. 
Specifically, one might hold that whether a set of truths has any epistemic value depends 
partially upon extrinsic (and contingent) features of the set. For instance, Goldman (1999) 
explicitly holds that epistemic value depends partially upon whether or not a person is interested 
in whether the relevant proposition is true or false (see also Alston (2005)). Thus, contra DePaul, 
even if one can provide two sets with the same number of true beliefs, it does not follow that 
they have the same epistemic value, given this view on the conditions under which something 
has epistemic value. 
Second, one can retain Truth Value Monism and account for the difference of value between 
the two sets by appealing to the particular contents of the truths. Part of the intuitive motivation 
behind DePaul’s criticism is that truths about (e.g.) organic chemistry are more important than 
truths about (e.g.) what’s going on right now on the left side of my visual field. One might try to 
cash out this importance in terms of the interest of inquirers, which would lead us back to a 
response similar to the one given in the previous paragraph. But one might cash out this 
importance in terms of the contents of the propositions themselves. The idea that some 
propositions are more “natural” or “cut nature at its joints” or are otherwise descriptively 
superior to others has gained some currency recently. One can hold that while any true belief has 
some epistemic value, a true belief has more epistemic value if its contents are more “natural.” In 
this way, the particular objects of belief can play a role in determining the overall value of a set 
of beliefs. While few have fully developed such a position, and I won’t do so here, I see no 
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reason why it cannot be. So DePaul is wrong that the only way to account for the difference in 
epistemic value between those two sets is to abandon Truth Value Monism.6 
B. DePaul’s Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism 
Turning to DePaul’s positive proposal, he argues that there are two kinds of things that have 
final epistemic value: true belief and warrant (1993: 77). He follows Plantinga as holding that 
warrant is “the epistemic feature which plays the preeminent role in distinguish mere true belief 
from knowledge” (1993: 67). Nevertheless, in contrast to Plantinga, DePaul does not take truth-
conduciveness to be necessary for warrant; warrant, for DePaul, is not believing in a way that is 
likely to be true. But if warrant is decoupled from believing in a truth-conducive way, what is it? 
DePaul despairs of giving a particularly helpful, positive account of warrant. He holds that it is 
believing “appropriately” specifically believing appropriately “in the face of experience” (1993: 
82-3).7 
DePaul gives an argument that believing appropriately in the face of experience is of final 
epistemic value. The argument is a thought experiment (1993: 80-1, 191-2). Imagine a non-
deceiving demon. The demon does not aim to make most of your beliefs about your immediate 
environment false; rather, the demon aims to disrupt the connection between your experiences on 
one hand and your beliefs and the world on the other. To this end, the demon gives you a visual 
field as if you were watching old Laurel and Hardy movies. Nevertheless, you continue to 
believe that you are (e.g.) currently sitting, reading a paper even as a slapstick gap unfolds before 
your eyes.  
This case illustrates a breakdown of warrant, according to DePaul. In it, while many of one’s 
beliefs may be true, they don’t appropriately fit one’s experience as of old movies. But it is not 
just that this case illustrates how warrant can breakdown; according to DePaul, it reveals an 
overly narrow conception of the epistemic value of experience. Truth Value Monists are 
concerned to evaluate the truth of beliefs and insofar as experiences are mentioned it is as 
instrumental to forming true beliefs. But experiences should play a more important role:  
When one recognizes the possibility of correspondences among experiences, 
belief, and reality, it is easy to see that such a person’s cognitive state may fall 
short of epistemic excellence. For it might be that there is the same sort of 
incoherence between the person’s experience and his belief as epistemologists 
fear to find between belief and reality. And, I maintain, where there is such an 
experiential incoherence, we fall short of warrant and knowledge, no matter what 
the connection between our beliefs and truths. (1993: 86) 
It is not obvious how best to regiment DePaul’s argument. I think the following captures it 
fairly. First, in the non-deceiving case, there is an “incoherence” between the experiences of the 
subject and the way the subject is forming beliefs that is disvaluable. Second, that disvalue 
cannot be understood in terms of the instrumental disvalue of forming false beliefs because the 
subject is forming true beliefs. Therefore, we must think that the disvalue is a kind of final 
epistemic disvalue. Thus, there is something of final epistemic value in forming beliefs that 
 
6A similar kind of move to appeal to the particular objects of attitudes has been made by Fred Feldman in 
defending a form of hedonism; see his (2004). For a different kind of response to DePaul on this issue see Treanor 
(2014).  
7 There are problems with DePaul’s view when applied to a wide range of cases of knowledge. Perhaps 
responding appropriately to one’s experiences is important for distinguishing between true belief and knowledge for 
certain kinds of knowledge like perceptual or even testimonial knowledge. But it is not clear how it will apply to 
other cases, including not only moral knowledge (as DePaul is aware) but logical, mathematical, or inductive 
knowledge. I’ll set aside these worries in what follows, though.  
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“appropriately fit” one’s experiences and something of final epistemic disvalue in forming 
beliefs that do not “appropriately fit” one’s experiences. Thus, Truth Value Monism is false. 
Why think that, in the non-deceiving case, there is an incoherence between the experiences 
the subject is having and the way the subject is forming beliefs? DePaul assumes that we can tell 
there is something defective here by simply comparing experiences and beliefs. In other words, 
the appropriate belief response to one’s experience supervenes just on those qualitative 
experiences, or sensations, themselves. Other facts—about whether, e.g., one is being messed 
with by an evil demon—are irrelevant. And it is natural for him to think this. After all, 
incoherence is an internal relation. So if there is an incoherence here it should be determined 
solely by the beliefs and experiences.  
However, this view is implausible. For this view ignores the general or specific cognitive 
abilities of the cognizer having the experience. The relevance of a cognizer’s cognitive abilities 
becomes clear when we consider less extreme examples. For instance, when I was seven and I 
had a certain olfactory experience, I did not form any beliefs about what caused it; now when I 
have the very same olfactory experience, I form the belief that someone is brewing coffee. It was 
inappropriate for me to form the belief that someone was brewing coffee then, it is not so now. 
Or, consider a novice bird watcher. Upon seeing a bird initially, it will be inappropriate for the 
bird watcher to believe it’s a woodpecker (he’s only started watching birds yesterday). But after 
a decade of watching birds, if the now expert bird watcher has the exact same visual experience, 
it would be appropriate to form a belief that it’s a woodpecker. These examples show that what 
constitutes an appropriate response to experience doesn’t supervene on just the experience the 
person has. 
Indeed, there is a more principled reason for denying that appropriate responses supervene 
on just the experiences a cognizer has. Recall that, for DePaul, warrant is both responding 
appropriately to one’s experience and the property that plays the chief role in distinguishing 
knowledge from mere true belief. There are (and could be) many different kinds of cognizers that 
know things, and even among cognizers of the same type or kind (such as human beings), there 
are many different kinds of things they know—different “sources of knowledge” as it is 
sometimes put. Consequently, if warrant is that property which helps account for the difference 
between knowledge and mere true belief in all (or even most) of these cases, warrant (or the 
degree of warrant) will presumably supervene partially on the different cognitive facilities of the 
different cognizers. But if, as DePaul claims, warrant is also responding appropriately to one’s 
experience, then it follows that responding appropriately to one’s experience will supervene 
partially on the different cognitive faculties of different cognizers. 
In response, DePaul might press that even if it’s not true, generally speaking, that what is 
appropriate to believe should supervene solely upon our experiences, surely in the cases provided 
above it is clear that those cognizers aren’t responding appropriately to their experiences. But 
even this is doubtful. After all, in those cases, the non-deceiving demon has radically altered 
their cognitive faculties so that, really, the experiences they have are playing no role in how they 
are forming beliefs. But given how radically different that way of forming beliefs is from how 
we form beliefs, we should not be very confident that not responding to their experiences is the 
right way of “responding” to their experiences. So, I claim, it is not clear that in DePaul’s non-
deceiving demon case the subjects are forming beliefs in an “incoherent” way or a way that is 
inappropriate.  
Additionally, when we think more about the role that cognitive abilities play in determining 
appropriate responses to experience, we are led back to the instrumentally valuable picture of 
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experience. Specifically, it is natural to think that the appropriateness of certain beliefs vary with 
the reliability or truth-conduciveness of a cognizer’s cognitive abilities. The reason why it is 
appropriate for my current self to believe that someone is brewing coffee on the basis of a 
particular olfactory experience, but not my seven year old self, is that the former can very 
reliably pick out coffee by scent whereas the latter could not. Similarly, the expert bird watcher 
is much more reliable when it comes to identifying woodpeckers. This explains why it is 
appropriate for the expert, but not the novice, to believe a certain bird is a woodpecker on the 
basis of a certain visual experience (cf. Goldman (2012)). (It’s worth noting that when DePaul 
goes into detail about beliefs that are appropriate for him (1993: 82-3) they are all cases of 
beliefs that were arrived at reliably.) Thus, when we reflect on how cognitive abilities are 
relevant to the appropriateness of beliefs, we are most naturally pushed back to understanding 
warrant, i.e. responding to one’s experiences appropriately, as having a close connection to truth-
conduciveness and the instrumental model DePaul criticizes.  
C. More on Epistemically Appropriate Responses to Experiences 
In discussing DePaul’s argument, I briefly argued that appropriately responding to one’s 
experience required forming beliefs in a reliable or otherwise truth-conducive way. My argument 
for this turned on a discussion of how agents can learn to acquire beliefs on the basis of 
sensations. To be sure, I have not offered a full defense or development of these ideas. But I will 
briefly consider some alternative accounts of responding appropriately to one’s experience. To 
be clear, even if these other accounts are right, it would still not yet show that responding to 
one’s experiences appropriately or properly is of basic final epistemic value. We would still need 
an argument for that. Rather, they would at best undermine my positive proposal for the 
instrumental value of responding appropriately or properly to one’s experience. 
One account is Markie’s (2006). Broadly speaking, on Markie’s account, when a response to 
an experience is “epistemically appropriate” it is because we have learned or otherwise know 
how to identify objects and their features on the basis of those experiences (2006: 123, 130, 139). 
Markie then teases out three different “ways” a belief might be epistemically appropriate (2006: 
130-4). However, a full review of Markie’s account is unnecessary. For Markie thinks that a 
belief is “most fully” appropriate when it satisfies all three of his ways (2006: 134). Additionally, 
one of those ways requires that the way the belief is formed is authorized by a reliabilist norm. 
So I doubt Markie’s account is in deep tension with what I say here. 
A different proposal would be to appeal to seemings. It is unclear what a seeming is, though 
most authors think they are sui generis mental states wherein a proposition is presented “as true” 
or “forcefully”. So understood, seemings are not beliefs, inclinations to beliefs, or sensations. 
(Cf., e.g., Tolhusrt (1998), Huemer (2007), Cullison (2010), McAllister (2018).) The proposal 
would then be that while (e.g.) my 7 year old self and my current have the same sensations, I 
have a seeming that coffee is being brewed while my 7 year old self does not. Further, it is this 
difference of seemings that explains why it is epistemically appropriate for me to believe that 
someone is making coffee but it is not epistemically appropriate for my 7 year old. (Though he is 
speaking of justified beliefs, and not appropriate responses to experiences, Tucker (2010: 537-8) 
offers essentially this view.) 
Underlying this response is the view that, absent reasons for doubt, it is epistemically 
appropriate to believe that p if it seems to one that p. But such a view is very implausible. One 
problem is that there are a number of counterexample to it. For instance, Peter Markie gives the 
following example (2005: 357). I have a sensation as of a walnut tree. I have two seemings. First, 
that there is a walnut tree. Second, that the walnut tree was planted in April 24th, 1914. I form 
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both beliefs. But clearly the second one of these beliefs is not an epistemically appropriate 
response, setting aside whatever reasons for doubt I might have. But there is also a deep 
theoretical problem. Seemings can be caused in all sorts of epistemically problematic ways. But 
this view ignores that fact. Thus, this view will have the result that, so long as one lacks a 
relevant reason to doubt, it is appropriate to form a belief as a result of a seeming even if that 
belief was formed by biases, wishful thinking, poor reasoning, poor education—not to mention 
brain lesions, evil geniuses and clairvoyant powers. And that is very implausible.8 
V. Valuing the Valuable 
This final section presents an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that I believe 
succeeds. It does not turn on the particularities of epistemological theories but plausible general 
claims about value.  
A. An Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism 
The argument contains the following premises. The first is this: 
Iterated Appropriateness: If someone bears an appropriate attitude towards 
something of final value, then it is appropriate to bear a pro-attitude towards the 
fact that they bore an appropriate attitude towards something of final value.  
This assumption is plausible on the face of it. Here is an additional reason for thinking it is true. 
Suppose a person bore a pro-attitude towards something of value—e.g., a friend is pleased that 
her son is happy. Now suppose a further person was aware of this pleasure but was either 
indifferent towards her attitude or even adopted a con-attitude towards it. We would normally 
think that such a person is behaving in way that is at least insensitive if not inappropriate. A 
natural explanation for this is that it is appropriate to value the fact that a person is adopting an 
appropriate attitude towards something of value.9 Of course, in this situation, the person is aware 
of the appropriate attitude. But even if someone is not aware of an appropriate attitude, it can still 
be appropriate for someone to bear a pro-attitude towards it. To use an analogy, it might be 
appropriate to praise a person for a very difficult basketball shot. (After all, the shot was 
difficult.) This might be appropriate even if no one is aware of it (besides, of course, the person 
who made the shot).  
Earlier I assumed that when it is appropriate to adopt a pro-attitude towards something, then 
that thing is of final value. Given that assumption, Iterated Appropriateness implies:  
Iterated Value: If someone bears an appropriate attitude towards something of 
final value, then the fact that they bore an appropriate attitude towards something 
of final value is, itself, of final value. 
Like Iterated Appropriateness, Iterated Value is quite plausible. Several contemporary 
philosophers have adopted something close to it, though they usually add some qualifications 
and make additional claims about such a principle that are independent to our discussion. (See, 
e.g., Nozick (1981: 428ff.), Hurka (1992: chps. 1&2), Zimmerman (2001: chp. 6), Adams (2007: 
chp. 2).) Now Iterated Value is formulated simply in terms of final value. But my immediate 
 
8 The issues mentioned here mirror issues about the cognitive penetration objection to Phenomenal 
Conservatism. (I criticize Phenomenal Conservatism at greater length in Perrine (forthcoming).) But there are some 
differences. First, we are here considered with epistemically appropriate responses to experiences, not necessarily 
justified beliefs. Second, cognitive penetration occurs when a cognitive state directly impacts a perceptual state 
(Lyons (2015: 154)) and my objection is not of that form. For additional critical discussion of the view in the text, as 
well as Phenomenal Conservatism, see Markie (2005, 2006), Alexander (2011) Siegel (2012, 2013), Brogaard 
(2013), McGrath (2013), and Lyons (2015).  
9 Of course, sometimes people have excuses for not valuing things—they are too busy, their minds are 
elsewhere, etc. The existence of such excuses does not undermine the point.  
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concern is final epistemic value. Since final epistemic value is a kind of final value, it is 
plausible that Iterated Value implies: 
Iterated Epistemic Value: If someone bears an appropriate attitude towards 
something of final epistemic value, then the fact that they bore an appropriate 
attitude towards something of final epistemic value is, itself, of final epistemic 
value. 
Here’s a simple argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Suppose, as is very plausible, 
some true belief is of final epistemic value. Now suppose an agent bears a positive attitude 
towards the fact that someone has a true belief. By Iterated Epistemic Value, it follows that such 
a pro-attitude is of final epistemic value. Therefore, Epistemic Value Pluralism is true. 
This simple argument contains one lacuna. Recall that a proper formulation of Epistemic 
Value Pluralism must hold that there are several things of basic final epistemic value. Merely 
maintaining that there are a number of ontologically distinct things of final epistemic value is not 
enough. So this simple argument needs to be shored up by maintaining that adopting a pro-
attitude towards something of final epistemic value is, itself, of basic final epistemic value.  
Here is a reason for thinking that adopting a pro-attitude towards something of final 
epistemic value is of basic final epistemic value. If it were merely of non-basic final value, then 
all of the value it has could be explained by appealing to the thing of final epistemic value that 
the attitude is directed to. But it cannot. Suppose some belief that p is of final epistemic value. 
Now suppose one agent adopts a pro-attitude towards it while another agent adopts a neutral 
attitude towards it. Given Iterated Epistemic Value, one of those attitudes is of final epistemic 
value, while (plausibly) the other is not. But both are about the same thing of final epistemic 
value. Thus, appealing to just what the attitude is about—its object—cannot explain the final 
epistemic value of adopting the pro-attitude. So adopting a pro-attitude towards something of 
final epistemic value is of basic final epistemic value. But some true beliefs are also of basic, 
final epistemic value. Thus, Epistemic Value Monism—and all versions of it, e.g., Truth Value 
Monism—are false. Epistemic Value Pluralism is true.  
B. Epistemic Value and Value Simpliciter  
In the remainder, I want to focus on what will be a surprising inference to some authors 
working on epistemic value: my inference of Iterated Epistemic Value from Iterated Value. That 
inference assumed that final epistemic value is a kind of final value. However, that assumption 
has been questioned by some philosophers. They deny that epistemic value is a kind of final 
value, or more weakly, that if something is of final epistemic value, then it is of value 
simpliciter. For instance, Ernest Sosa claims that there are various “domains” of evaluation, with 
the epistemic domain being just one among many. These domains admit of “value.” And, for 
each domain, some of that value is “fundamental” and others “derived” from the fundamental 
value of that domain. But none of this indicates that the fundamental value of a given domain is 
of final value simpliciter. Perhaps it is of some domain independent value, but it is not final 
value but (e.g.) instrumental value to some domain independent value. As Sosa once wrote, 
“Truth may or may not be intrinsically valuable absolutely, who knows? Our worry requires only 
that we consider truth the epistemically fundamental value, the ultimate explainer of other 
distinctively epistemic values” (2007: 72). Similar kinds of views have been endorsed by others. 
Duncan Pritchard likewise allows that something might be of “fundamental epistemic good” 
without that good being “finally valuable simpliciter” (2010: 12). Pritchard even suggests that 
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from the fact that truth is of epistemic value it need not follow that it has any value simpliciter at 
all (2014: 113).10  
These kinds of views are inconsistent with my claim that final epistemic value is a kind of 
final value, or at least that when something is of final epistemic value that implies it is of some 
final value. However, this disagreement would not simply undermine my argument from Iterated 
Value to Iterated Epistemic Value; it is inconsistent with the basic way that I have setup the 
issues of this paper. For this reason, evaluating this kind of position is a large task that I cannot 
complete here. With that in mind, I raise two issues. 
First, I assume that when something is of value it is valuable—that is, is worthy of value or 
it would otherwise be appropriate or fitting to value it. This view says that there is a kind of 
“value”—epistemic value—on which that is false. From the fact that something is of epistemic 
value it does not follow that it is worthy of value or that it would be appropriate to value it. 
(Maybe it is; maybe it isn’t.) To be sure, this view has a fallback position. If something is 
epistemically valuable, it may be epistemically appropriate to value it; or, from the epistemic 
point of view, it is worthy of valuing (cf. Pritchard (2014: 113)). But this view denies that it 
follows from the fact that something is epistemically appropriate to value that it is also 
appropriate to value it simpliciter. At this point, I have begun to loose touch with what these 
words are supposed to mean. The problem is not the lack of a formal semantic device for this 
view.11 The problem is more simply to understand what kind of thing deserves the title of value 
if it is not valuable! 
Second, even if this way of thinking about epistemic value is inconsistent with mine, we 
might want to know why we ought adopt it. So far as I can see, the main argument is this. The 
inference from ‘x is a value in domain D’ so ‘x is a value simpliciter’ is invalid. (After all, there 
might be values in the “coffee domain” or even the “torture domain” that are fundamental to 
those domains. But we would not normally claim that their values are values simpliciter. See, 
e.g., Sosa (2011: 63; 2007: 73-4).) Thus, the inference from ‘x is a value in the epistemic 
domain’ to ‘x is a value simpliciter’ is likewise invalid. To mimic the wording of Pritchard 
(2014), it is a “further step” to say that if something is of final value in some domain that it is of 
final value simpliciter.  
However, this argument is itself invalid. The following inference rule is certainly invalid: φ 
or ψ; therefore, φ. After all, there are many instances of this inference pattern that do not 
preserve truth. But some instances of it do preserve truth. The inference ‘A or A; therefore, A’ is 
perfectly valid and is an instance of that inference. Similarly, there may be many domains that do 
not track value simpliciter. Those domains are merely ways of evaluating things. But from the 
fact that some domains do not track value simpliciter it does not follow that some particular 
domain also does not track value simpliciter. So this argument fails. 
Of course, some might want to know why we should think that if something is of 
fundamental value in the epistemic domain that it follows that it is valuable simpliciter. A 
number of arguments could be developed here. One promising argument is through the similarity 
of epistemic evaluation and moral evaluation. Some authors have noticed that the kind of 
normativity, broadly construed, involved in moral and epistemic evaluations are very similar. 
But moral evaluations are widely thought to involve value simpliciter. If something is valuable in 
 
10 Something like this picture is also implicit in Oliveira (2017), though generalized beyond issues of epistemic 
value. And there are some terminological issues that I’m ignoring here. 
11 For instance, one could utilize Geach’s (1956) distinction between “attributive” and “predicative” adjectives 
(or an analogous version for adverbs). Ridge (2013) is relevant here.  
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the moral domain it is valuable simpliciter. So too if something is valuable in the epistemic 
domain it is valuable simpliciter. (For discussion, positive and critical, of this kind of reasoning, 
see Cuneo (2007), Cowie (2014, 2016), Rowland (2013, 2016), Das (2016, 2017).) 
Additionally, there is a problem for epistemologists who deny that values in the epistemic 
domain are not necessarily values simpliciter.12 Let us take seriously Sosa’s suggestion that 
human beings are “zestfully judgmental across the gamut of our experience” (2007: 70). Of 
course, different “domains” of evaluations can issue different judgments of the same thing. 
Inside the “aesthetic” domain, a particular gourd might be bad because it is ugly; but inside the 
“culinary” point of view it might be excellent, ready for one’s fall soup. But there might be an 
“epistemic*” domain and in it true beliefs are not a fundamental epistemic* value; perhaps 
nothing is, or maybe only reasonable attitudes are. And perhaps there is an “epistemic**” 
domain where true beliefs are a fundamental epistemic** value, but knowledge is not more 
epistemically** valuable than true belief. Given such domains,13 a natural question is why 
should we give more attention to the epistemic domain than the epistemic* or epistemic** 
domain? This question is pressing for those who do not see the epistemic domain as tracking 
value simpliciter. But for those of us who see the epistemic domain as tracking value simpliciter 
there is a straightforward response. We should focus on the epistemic domain, instead of these 
competitors, because the epistemic domain tracks value simpliciter in a way that those other 
domains need not.  
For these reasons, I think, this kind of response to my argument for Epistemic Value 
Pluralism is unpromising.14 
  
 
12 This problem is inspired by Stich’s (1990) arguments against the value of true belief. But it is not quite the 
same. I discuss Stich’s argument in Perrine (2017: 246-253).  
13 If some domains do not already exist, we could easily introduce them. After all, prior to the cultivation and 
invention of coffee, there was not the “coffee domain” (or, there was, and it just wasn’t used).  
14 After writing this paper, I stumbled upon Kurt Sylvan’s (2018). In it, Sylvan argues that we can retain the 
idea that “accurate belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value” (2018: 382) so long as we reject the view that 
“accurate belief is the sole non-instrumental epistemic value” (2018: 382). (By ‘non-instrumental value’ Sylvan just 
means ‘final value’ (cf. (2018: 431).) Sylvan’s idea is that some things have a value that is derived from accurate 
belief in a way other than being instrumentally valuable. In defending his ideas, Sylvan even uses a principle of 
Hurka’s (1992) reformulated in terms of “derivative non-instrumental value” (2018: 383).  
Comparing Sylvan’s argument to mine is difficult because he does not setup his discussion in terms of basic vs. 
non-basic final epistemic value. But there is a close affinity of our ideas. With that in mind, I’ll make three brief 
comments. First, if by ‘fundamental epistemic value’ Sylvan means “basic final epistemic value” then we disagree. 
For I’ve argued that there are more things of basic final epistemic value than true beliefs. Second, if Sylvan thinks 
things of “derivative non-instrumental value” are things whose value can be entirely explained by appealing to the 
value of true belief, then we disagree. For I’ve argued there are some things of final epistemic value whose value 
cannot be fully explained by appealing to true beliefs. Finally, though Sylvan and I both sympathetically cite authors 
like Hurka, Sylvan offers a thinner reading of them. Specifically, Sylvan maintains that there can be responses to 
final value that are themselves of final value while those responses do not require forming any pro-attitudes. I think 
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